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     NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
             AND ITS FUTURE 
                          Mitsuru Kurosawa*
  With the demise of the Cold War era, a new international security order is being 
sought by many statesmen and scholars all over the world. The nuclear non-prolifera-
tion regime whose central place is occupied by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), has played a very important role in maintaining international peace and security. 
Its importance has been increased recently in proportion with the improvement of 
East-West relations. As the dangen of nuclear confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union or Russia has declined, the langer of the spread of nuclear 
weapons gets new momentum.1) 
  In 1995, a conference of the NPT parties to decide the future of the treaty will be 
held. The NPT was adopted and opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force 
in 1970. Every five years after the entry into force of the treaty, review conferences 
have been held to examine its implementation. These conferences have been useful 
for discussing the progress of the purposes and provisions of the treaty, but the 1995 
extension conference is of crucial importance in deciding the future position of the 
NPT. 
  Article 10, paragraph 2 of the NPT stipulates as follows: 
       Twenty-five years after the entry into forceof the treaty, aconference 
     shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force 
    indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. 
    The decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. 
  In this paper, I would like to examine the kind of role the NPT regime will play in 
international society from now on, what measures are necessary to maintain and 
improve the regime and, if it has some deficits, how they can be corrected. With these 
problems in mind, in the First chapter I will deal with how the NPT regime has been 
formed and strengthened and its characteristics. In the second chapter, 1will examine 
* Professor of International Law, Faculty ofLaw, Osaka University. 
1) New Dimension f Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era, Report ofthe Secretary-
   General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A/C.1/47/7, 23 October 1992, pp.8-9. 
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the discussions at the four review conferences, because these have been the forum in 
which the regime has been scrutinized critically by the parties. In the third chapter, I 
will propose some measures to strengthen the regime in the future, which include 
universal participation to the treaty, nuclear disarmament, security of the non-nuclear-
weapon states and the application of safeguards. 
       I The Formation and Characteristics of the NPT Regime 
i) The Formation of the NPT Regime 
  In 1946, at the Atomic Energy Commission established by the First resolution of 
the United Nations General Assembly, the representative of the United States, Mr. 
Bernard Baruch, proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development 
Authority entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. It 
was the first attempt to control the spread of nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union 
would' not agree because itmeant he U.S. would have a monopoly in nuclear energy 
and it was impossible to be realized. 
  In 1953, the United States changed its policy an nuclear energy, and President 
Eisenhower proposed "Atoms for Peace" , that is, the promotion of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy under safeguards. This proposal subsequently ed to the creation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. According to the Article XII of 
the IAEA Statute, IAEA safeguards have been applied to nuclear cooperation by the 
United States and other countries, and these were the first realization of the effort to 
prevent he spread of nuclear weapons. 
  Disarmament negotiations under the United Nations in early years concentrated 
their energy an comprehensive disarmament, but alter it proved impossible in late 
1950s, they focused an more specific measures like a nuclear test ban and nuclear 
non-proliferation. The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a 
resolution in 1961 which defined non-proliferation and called upon states to start 
negotiations for the treaty, although the negotiation came to an impasse because of 
NATO's plan for MLF(multilateral nuclear force). 
  The first treaty which prevented the spread of nuclear weapons was the 1963 Partial 
Test Ban Treaty.21 This treaty, prohibiting tests in the atmosphere and under water while 
permitting testing underground, in effect has prevented new states from conducting 
2) President Kennedy, in his Radio-Television Address an July 26, 1963, told that "this treaty can be a step 
    toward preventing he spread of nuclear weapons to nations ot now possessing "them." USACDA,Docu-
    ments ofDi.rm ament 1963, p.254.
1993] NUCLEAR NON-PROUFERATION REGIME AND ITS FUTURE 23 
nuclear tests because of the technological and financial difficulties of underground 
tests. 
  The Treaty an the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the central 
structure of the NPT regime and directly deals with the problem, was open for signature 
an July 1,1968 and entered into force an March 5,1970. The core of its obligations is 
provided for in Articles I and II. Nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) party to the treaty 
undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any 
one, and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) undertake not to receive or manufacture 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These obligations were decided 
by the United States and the Soviet Union only, who rejected all proposals for 
amendments by the NNWSs. Full-scope safeguards are applied only to NNWSs 
according to Article IH. 
  In contrast withthese, Article IV provides for cooperation in peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and Article VI primarily stipulates an obligation of NWSs to negotiate 
nuclear disannament measures in good faith. These two articles were inserted as a 
compensation to NNWSs who assumed heavy and substantial obligations of non-
proliferation. There is no provision which concerns ecurity assurances of NNWSs, 
though the Security Council adopted a resolution an positive security assurances. 
  A second approach to prevent he spread of nuclear weapons is the establishment 
of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). NWFZ is a regional approach in contrast to 
the global one of the NPT, and includes the obligation ot to deploy nuclear weapons 
as well as non-proliferation. Article VII of the NPT encourages the creation of 
NWFZs. 
  The first treaty which established NWFZ is the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin 
America of 1967. Its Additional Protocol II which all five NWSs have already ratified 
includes an obligation of NWSs not to use nuclear weapons against any party to the 
treaty in the zone. The second one is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 
1985, and it also includes Protocol 2 which prohibits use of nuclear weapons against 
parties, although only two NWSs have ratified it so far. These two treaties have 
adopted aconcept of negative security assurances. 
  A third approach is the conclusionof safeguards agreements with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the application of its safeguards. Parties to the 
NPT or a treaty establishing NWFZ are naturally under the obligation to accept 
safeguards to all its peaceful nuclear activities, but other countries have to accept 
safeguards only to nuclear materials or facilities which they receive from the parties. 
Recently there has been a strong trend to extend the scope of safeguards to include all 
nuclear materials and facilities in those countries.
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  A final approach is a common export control policy among nuclear supplier nations. 
London Nuclear Suppliers Group adopted guidelines for nuclear export and made a 
list of materials which trigger safeguards if exported. 
  The last two approaches are especially directed to states which would not become 
parties to the NPT or a treaty creating NWFZ but want o receive nuclear assistance. 
  The NPT regime is made of these international legal documents and common 
policies among nuclear suppliers. 
ii) The Characteristics of the NPT Regime 
  The NPT regime provides a fundamental framework within which activities con-
ceming nuclear weapons and peaceful ses of nuclear energy shall be conducted. As 
the raison d'etre of the regime isto prevent the emergence of new NWSs, every activity 
concerning the development of nuclear weapons by NNWSs is prohibited, while NWSs 
are free to improve their nuclear weapon capabilities. 
  With the context of the interrelationship between or among NNWSs, security of a 
NNWS would be strengthened in so far as 'its neighbor or rival state renounces the 
Option of nuclear weapons. And in the context of global security, the increase in the 
number of NWSs would increase the risk of nuclear conflicts. In these two settings, 
the regime has its own merits for international peace and security. 
  But when you think of the regime as a division of NWSs and NNWSs, the two 
groups of states have different kinds of obligations. And some states argue that he 
regime is discriminatory.3) The fact that many NNWSs have acceded to the treaty in 
spite of its discriminatory character, means that many NNWSs not only take into 
account the merits of the treaty, but also think that its shortcomings can be corrected 
by the nuclear disarmament measures undertaken bythe NWSs. Article VI provides 
obligations for the NWSs to negotiate in good faith nuclear disarmament measures, 
and it was expected by many states that nuclear disarmament measures would be 
implemented in the near future. 
  The fundamentalstructure of the NPT regime which divides states into two 
categories and maintains the status quo regarding the possession f nuclear weapons 
to only one category ofstates, uggests hat he very possession ofnuclear weapons 
has its own significance in international society. The first is a military value, and the 
regime guarantees NWSs to be militarily prominent powers. But if the states which 
now have nuclear weapons behave as if it is safer with nuclear weapons than without 
3) W. Mendl, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Le sons from the Past," in C. F. Barnaby (ed), Preventino he 
   Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1969, p.177.
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them, many states will follow the course 4) And as long as the NWSs continue an 
endless and meaningless nuclear arms race, they can not persuade NNWSs that nuclear 
weapons are neither necessary nor useful for their security.5) 
  The possession of nuclear weapons also haspolitical as well as military value 
because of its extremely destructive power. The political value of the possession f 
nuclear weapons has its ramifications ot only in the nuclear sphere but also in broader 
international relations ingeneral. The regime has been promoted mainly by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and it is suggested that he regime was an attempt by the 
two states to jointly control world affairs6) and they played a role of joint nuclear 
policemen.7) The regime implies not only the monopoly ofnuclear weapons by a small 
group of states, but also consolidation f the NWSs, especially the United States and 
the Soviet Union, as dominant powers in international affairs. 
  By the definition of the treaty, NWSs have been permanent members of the Security 
Council of the United Nations ince 1971, when the People's Republic of China got 
the right of representation. This fact also reinforces the political value of the possession 
of nuclear weapons with privileged Status inthe United Nations. 
  The NPT regime, while contributing to international .peace and security by prevent-
ing an emergence of new NWSs, underscores the political as well as military value of 
nuclear weapons. It is this political and military value of nuclear weapons that is the 
deficit of the regime. 
  The mostsignificant s ep toward reducing this deficit is to take measures for nuclear 
disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the treaty. The freeze or reduction of 
nuclear weapons by NWSs does not necessarily strengthen the security of NNWSs, 
but does reduce the political and military value of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarma-
ment measures, which would reduce the political value of nuclear weapons, would 
make the desire of NNWSs to get nuclear weapons less intense. 
  A second concrete measure for NWSs to take is a promise never to use nuclear 
weapons against NNWSs. Negative security assurances, which prohibit use of nuclear 
weapons against NNWSs, would eprive NWSs of the political and military usefulness 
4) Theodore B. Taylor, "The International Regulation of Nuclear Energy: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: 
   Environment, S curity and Safety Consideration," C lumbia Journal ofTransnational Law, Vol.16, No.3, 
   1977, p.428. 
5) William Epstein, "Failure of Review Conference: Setback for Nuclear Proliferation," International Perspec-
   tive, May/June 1981, p.25. 
6) T. B. Millar, "The Nuciear Non-Proliferation Treatya d Super Power Condominium," in Carsten Holbraad 
   (ed.), Super Power and World Order, 1971, p.73. 
7) Richard Hudson, "N.P.T.: Nuclear Watershed,"Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol.6,.No.3, Fall 1968, p.242.
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of nuclear weapons against NNWSs, and the possibility of the political use of nuclear 
weapons would be reduced. 
            II Discussions at the NPT Review Conferences 
  Under the treaty, the obligations of non-proliferation ofnuclear weapons came into 
force as soon as the treaty was ratified and entered into force, but Article VI an nuclear 
disarmament and other provisions have the quality of gradual implementation.8) In 
accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, conferences have been held every five years 
in order to review the Operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that he purposes 
of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized. Although confer-
ences have been supposed to review all provisions in the treaty, the implementation f 
Article VI was the focus of discussion, because many states deal with the NPT as a 
step to nuclear disarmament.9) 
i) The First Review Conference, 1975 
  At the first conference, the most controversial topic among many of the NWSs and 
NNWSs was an the implementation of Article VI. While the United States and the 
Soviet Union argued that they were implementing the obligations under Artiele VI in 
good faith indicating the SALT 1 Agreements, Vladivostock Agreement, Sea-Bed 
Treaty and Biological Weapon Convention, almost all NNWSs believed that obliga-
tions under Article VI had not been implemented. 
  Non-aligned NNWSs submitted three draft additional protocols to the treaty. 
  Draft additional protocol I10} stipulates (1)the United States, the Soviet Union and 
United Kingdom undertake to decree the Suspension of all their underground nuclear 
weapon tests for a period of ten years, as soon as the number of Parties to the treaty 
reaches one hundred, (2)they undertake also to extend by three years the moratorium 
8) It was uggested that "The basic prophylactic provisions, Articles 1 and II, are important in themselves but 
   are of primary value as instruments through w ich the world may gain afew years'respite from uncontrolled 
   proliferation of nuclear weaponry; years which must be used to control the socalled "vertical proliferation" 
    of the two super-Powers." (Edwin Brown Firmage, "The Treaty an the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
    Weapons," American Journal of International Law, Vol.63, No.4, Ostober 1969, p.746.) 
9) For example, a Japanese delegate expressed the opinion that "Since the non-proliferation treaty must not be 
    an end in itself, but one step forward in a series ofarms control and isarmament measures to be taken 
    following itsconclusion, t will be crucially important to review its operation periodically, nd, we think, at 
    fairly frequent i ervals." A/C.1/PV.1565, 10 May 1968, para.86. 
10) NPT/CONF/17, 2 May 1975, submitted by Ghana, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, 
   Yugoslavia and Zaire.
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contemplated in the preceding article, each time that five additional states become 
Parties to the Treaty, (3)they undertake to transform the moratorium into a treaty for 
that purpose, as soon as the other nuclear weapon states indicate their willingness to 
become parties to said treaty. 
  Draft additional protocol IIll) provides (1)the United States and the Soviet Union 
undertake, as soon as the number of parties to the treaty has reached one hundred: (a) 
to reduce by fifty per cent the ceiling an 2,400 nuclear strategic. delivery vehicles 
contemplated for each side under the Vladivostok accords; (b) to reduce likewise by 
fifty percent the ceiling of 1,320 strategic ballistic missiles which each side may equip 
with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's), (2)they also undertake, 
once such reductions have been carried out, to reduce by ten per cent the ceilings of 
1,200 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of 660 strategic ballistic missiles that may 
be equipped with MIRV's, each time that ten additional states become parties to the 
treaty. 
  Draft additional protocol X12) stipulates (1)the United States, the Soviet Union and 
the United Kingdom solemnly undertake (a) never and under no circumstances touse 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the 
treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and (b) to refrain 
from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon states parties 
to the treaty. 
  Although these proposals were worth considering at the conference, the United 
States and the Soviet Union refused even to discuss the draft protocols by insisting that 
they Gould not discuss them in the review conference, because they were tantamount 
to amendments tothe treaty provisions. 
  At the first conference,there was no progress in the discussions an disarmament, 
and it became clear that there was a big difference as to the interpretation of Article 
Vl. The conference almost failed but a president saved the conference by submitting 
a draft final declaration, which was adopted by consensus. 
ii) The Second Conference, 1980 
  At the second conference, the discussion an nuclear disarmament was the most 
controversial nd they failed to adopt a final declaration. The conference was held in 
11) NPT/CONF/18, 2 May 1975, submitted by Ghana, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, 
   Yugoslavia and Zaire. 
12) NPT/CONF/22, 15 May 1975, submitted by Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan d 
   Zaire.
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a deteriorating i ternational atmosphere, b cause there was no prospect of SALT II 
treaty ratification by the United States, no progress an comprehensive test ban (CTB) 
negotiations, and the new introduction f intermediate-range nuclear forces to Western 
Europe. 
  As to the evaluation of the implementation of Article VI, non-aligned countries 
were very critical and argued that he nuclear arms race still continued with much vigor. 
States like Canada, Japan and Hungary expressed deep concern about he continuing 
arms race, though they admitted some progress inthe field. The United States and the 
Soviet Union maintained that here was some progress inthe implementation of Article 
VI, though the progress was slow and partial. 
  The main demand by NNWSs at this conference was procedural, not substantial, 
and they asked to start negotiations anCTB at a working roup of the Committee an 
Disarmament i  Geneva. But three NWSs preferred tripartite negotiations to multi-
lateral ones, and the United States opposed any idea of a moratorium. 
  The Stockholm Peace Research Institute analyzed thesituation as follows: 
      The demands of the Group of 77 at the Second NPT Review Con-
     ference were, in fact, minimal. They did not insist an instant nuclear 
    disarmament but insisted only an some tangible vidence of thenuclear 
     powers' commitment to reach agreements leading to such disarmament. 
     However, the nuclear powers had come ssentially empty-handed to the 
     Conference, obviously unprepared forthe vehemence of the debatean 
     this article.13) 
iii) The Third Conference, 1985 
  In the period which the conference r viewed, that is, from 1980 to 1985, the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was at a low point and in 
effect no progress was seen in nuclear disarmament. Fortunately the attitude of 
NNWSs was not too militant and they succeeded in adopting a final declaration. 
  The NNWSs asserted that last five years had passed without any progress in the 
implementation of Article VI, and the final declaration evaluated the implementation 
of Article VI as follows: 
      The conference oncluded that, since no agreements had been reached 
     in the period under review an effective measures relating to the cessation 
     of an arms race at an early date, an nuclear disarmament a d anatreaty 
     an general nd complete disarmament u der strict and effectiveinterna-
13) "The Second NPT Review Conference," World Armaments a d Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p.329.
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     tional control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 
    12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet 
     been achieved.l4) 
iv) The Fourth Conference, 1990 
  The fourth conference of 1990 had been expected to be successful15) because the 
international climate was getting better with the end of the cold war. The Intermediate-
range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty was concluded and the fundamental framework of 
the Strategic Arms Reduction (START ) Treaty was agreed. The participants also had 
in their mind the 1995 extension conference. 
  As to the implementation f Article VI, in sharp contrast with previous conferences, 
many states agreed that there was substantial progress in nuclear disarmament. Es-
timation of the progress of CTB negotiations, however, was varied. 
  The United States and the United Kingdom took the position that a CTB was a 
long-term goal, and they had no will to tackle the problem immediately. They felt that 
the problem should be dealt with gradually by a step-by-step formula. On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to enter negotiations an a CTB and 
asked the United States and the United Kingdom to follow and accept a moratorium. 
  Many NNWSs welcomed the progress in nuclear disarmament and demanded that 
NWSs should start substantial negotiations of a CTB in good faith at the Conference 
an Disarmament inGeneva, but they were against the linkage of progress of CTB with 
the problem of NPT extension. 
  A few NNWSs including Mexico argued that a CTB could be the best contribution 
for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and that it was imperative to conclude 
a multilateral CTB treaty before 1995.16) This meant a direct linkage of the conclusion 
of a CTB treaty with an extension of the treaty after 1995. Particularly because of the 
difference of opinions between Mexico and the United States, the conference failed to 
adopt a final declaration.17) 
  At the conference, Nigeria submitted aproposal an negative security assurances, 
and Egypt introduced a proposal an positive security guarantees, and they appealed 
for the need to tackle these problems in the new international c imate. 
14) NPT/CONF.III/64/I, 25 September 1985. 
15) Charles N.Van Doren, "Prognosis for the Fourth Review Conference," Arms Control Today, June 1990, 
    pp.18-21. 
16) NPT/CONF.IV/MC.1/WP.4, 3 September 1990. 
17) John Simpson, "The 1990 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty," Round Table, 
   Vol.318, 1991, pp. 143-144.
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  1 followed the arguments at four review conferences, mainly examining the im-
plementation ofArticle VI of the treaty, because in order to make the NPT more fair 
and equitable, it is necessary to make progress in nuclear disarmament. The implemen-
tation of Article VI has been the problem which attracted many states and the hottest 
issue at the conferences. 
  Surely the reviews covered every aspect of the treaty, and the central obligations 
of the treaty, that is, the obligations of non-transfer, non-acquisition and non-production 
were thought generally respected, and there existed a strong support for Articles I and 
11. 
  As to Article III, there was some criticism that in the application of safeguards, 
parties to the treaty were treated less advantageous than non-parties, and that NNWSs 
parties to the treaty were in a handicapped position in comparison with NWSs. The 
situation has been ameliorated gradually in the former case by the general trends to 
ask for full-scope safeguards to non-parties, and in the latter rase by applying 
safeguards to some facilities of NWSs. 
  As to the cooperation in thefield of peaceful uses of nuclear energy stipulated in 
Article IV, some NNWSs argued that the preferential treatment for parties to the treaty 
was not a general practice, and the export control by the nuclear supplier states hindered 
the assistance toNNWSs for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some measures for these 
claims were taken and the aspiration for nuclear energy in general has been decreasing. 
    III Proposals for Maintaining and Strengthening the NPT Regime 
i) Universality of and Compliance with the Treaty 
  (a) France and China 
  France and China, which detonated nuclear devices in 1960 and 1964 respectively, 
became NWSs later than the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, 
and opposed the NPT as well as the Partial Test Ban Treaty because they did not like 
the world system dominated by the latter states, although the NPT regime would 
guarantee a privileged status for them.18) 
  With the end of the Cold Warera, China in March 1992 and France in August 1992 
ratified the NPT and became parties to the treaty. It is significant for all five NWSs to 
become parties to the treaty. France and China had argued that they would support the 
NPT regime although they would not be parties to the treaty, but their policies were 
not so strict as ones of the parties. With the participation of the two states, the danger 
18) Harald Muller, "Western Europe Needs Treaty," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3uly/August 1990, p.29.
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of nuclear proliferation will decrease as they undertake the obligations of Article I. 
  More important is the fact that the obligations under Article VI also apply to these 
states. At the review conferences, they were not criticized because they were not 
parties, but now they have to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and with 
the deep reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia, they as well 
as the United Kingdom would have to be involved in the negotiations of strategic 
nuclear weapon reduction. In particular, for the resolution of the CTB problem, it is 
urgent for France and China to participate positively in negotiations for it. In this point, 
the accession by France and China to the treaty has a profound meaning. 
  (b) South Africa 
  South Africa had been one of the proliferation-oriented states because of its 
possession of abundant uranium in their territory and its position of international 
isolation. After the improvement of the situation in southern Africa in general and the 
progress towards domestic democratization, i  July 1991 the Republic of South Africa 
signed the NPT. The republic was believed to be developing nuclear weapons and 
many suspicions about heir behavior were reported. 
  Although caution against heir future conduct is necessary, it tends to change the 
whole map in Africa. As South Africa's participation to the treaty gets rid of any block 
for neighboring states to join as well, it should be possible to reinvigorate the efforts 
to create an African nuclear-weapon-free zone which has been pursued since 1960. 
The establishment of an African NWFZ would not only enhance the security of African 
states, but also contribute to make the whole Southern hemisphere free from nuclear 
weapons, together with the Treaty of Tiatelolco, the Rarotonga Treaty and the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
  (c) Brazil and Argentina 
  In November1990, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina agreed to abandon 
formally the development of nuclear weapons, inspect each other's peaceful nuclear 
activities and adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Both states furthermore agreed in 
December 1991 to open their all nuclear facilities for full-scope safeguards by the 
IAEA. 
  The two countries were opposed to the NPT because of its discriminatory character, 
and under military administrations they continued the research and development of 
nuclear weapons, in particular for each other's rivairy and quest for hegemony in the 
South America. 
  As both states accepted IAEA safeguards in all their facilities, we can reasonably
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expect hey will accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the near future and also to the 
NPT. Acceding to the NPT regime by the two countries means not only the stopping 
of their own nuclear weapon programs but also helping stop proliferation in the third 
world as they are nuclear suppliers. 
  (d) India and Pakistan 
  India conducted a"peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974 and has been a NWS 
in substance, but has declared its willingness not to be a NWS. She has enough 
plutonium which is not under safeguards of the IAEA and continues with research and 
development ofnuclear weapons and missile technology. India has refused to sign the 
NPT for its discriminatory character. Pakistan, who declined to join the treaty, is 
believed to have enough capability to make nuclear weapons now. 
  While India was motivated by its defeat at a war with China in 1962 and China's 
detonation of nuclear device in 1964, Pakistan was motivated by its loss at a war with 
India in 1971 and India's explosion of nuclear device in 1974.19) Because of these 
chain-reactions, the situation here is very complicated. 
  Although the two states agreed not to attack nuclear facilities of each other, a 
proposal of Pakistan to hold a conference among five states, including the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China to talk about non-proliferation was rejected by 
India. The prospect for the two to accede to the treaty is so gloomy that confidence-
building measures are needed to improve the general situation in the area, if necessary, 
with the cooperation of the United Nations or outside big powers including China. 
  (e) Israel 
  It isgenerally believed that Israel had developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 
already possesses nearly 200 nuclear weapons now. As the country is surrounded by 
hostile Arab states, Israel's accession to the treaty would presuppose r gional security 
arrangements in the Middle East. 
  After the Gulf War, the United Sates and the Soviet Union recognized the necessity 
to make efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zone in 
the Middle East. President Bush announced an arms control initiative in May 1991, 
which led to the five power talks to establish guidelines for restraining destabilizing 
transfers of conventional rms and weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and 
technology. 
19) Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol.16, No.1, Summer 
   1991, p.48.
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  From October 1991, a peace conference an the Middle East started talks at the 
initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union. The conference is expected to take 
a long time to reach agreements, but we should expect the conference to build 
confidence among parties and lead to a lasting peace and nuclear-weapon-free region. 
  (f) North Korea 
  In spiteof ratifying the NPT in December 1985, North Korea has refused to 
negotiate and conclude asafeguards agreement with the IAEA. It is an obligation 
included in Article IR to conclude the agreement within 18 months after atification. 
Over the last few years international society has had a suspicion that North Korea was 
developing nuclear weapons, because of the existence of a plutonium reprocessing 
plant.20) 
  North Korea argued that as long as nuclear weapons of the United States were 
deployed inSouth Korea, it was impossible toaccept IAEA safeguards. After the threat 
from the Soviet Union almost disappeared with the end of the Cold War, in September 
1991, the United States announced itsdecision to withdraw land-based tactical nuclear 
weapons around the world. 
  After the withdrawal was confirmed, North and South Korea agreed an a joint 
declaration f denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula inDecember 1991, and North 
Korea concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA an January 30,1992. Al-
though the Situation i  the Korean Peninsula may have Small fluctuations, in the 
post-Cold War world they are making strong strides in the right direction. 
  (g) Iraq 
  Iraq, which has ratified the NPT in October 1969 and concluded a safeguards 
agreement, has subjected its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection for a long time. 
When the Israeli air force attacked a Iragi nuclear facility which was near completion 
in June 1981, the Director-General of the IAEA gave assurance that IAEA inspection 
guaranteed that Iraq was not preparing for developing uclear weapons. 
  After the Gulf War, an inspection team of the United Nations established by 
Security Council resolution 687(1991) found that in the facilities which were not 
declared and in which the IAEA did not apply safeguards, Iraq was conducting the 
development of nuclear weapons.21) 
20) See Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No.83, Summer 1991, pp.84-104. 
21) See William H.Lewis and Christopher C. Joyner, "Proliferation of U conventional Weapons: The Case for 
    Coercive Arms Control," Comparative S rategy, Vol.10, 1991, pp.299-309.
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  It reveals the fact that even if a state is a party to the treaty and accepts afeguards, 
it is possible to make nuclear weapons without being noticed. Pointing out Iraqi 
violations and criticizing them is not enough. The first thing we should do is to make 
a system which permits an inspection against suspect sites, and the second is to make 
efforts to bring peace in the Middle East in general.22) 
ii) Nuclear Disarmament 
  The second measure to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime is to implement 
the obligations tipulated in Article VI and produce concrete results. Although Article 
VI does not necessarily provide for the obligations to disarm, almost all NNWSs treat 
the NPT as a step to nuclear disarmament and there was a general understanding that 
not immediately but within a certain reasonable time the NWSs are obliged to take 
nuclear disarmament measures. 
  This measure is necessary also to take into account he demand of NNWSs that 
there should be a balance of obligations and responsibilities between NWSs and 
NNWSs. 
  (a) INF Treaty and START Treaty 
  On July 1,1968 when the NPT was open for signature, the United States and the 
Soviet Union announced the commencement of Strategie Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT). This means they expressed their intention to implement heir obligations 
under Article VI. Although the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty, SALT I Interim 
Agreement and SALT II Treaty were signed, the legal Status of the treaties an offensive 
arms was ambiguous and their regulations were tended to authorize both nations' 
nuclear programs, so that they did not stop the nuclear arms race, not to say nuclear 
disarmament. 
  In the Tate 1980s, with_the improvement of relations between East and West in 
general and the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, there appeared great 
progress in nuclear disarmament. On December 1987, the United States and the Soviet 
Union signed the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) Treaty and in accordance 
with the provisions of the treaty which entered into force an June 1,1988, they 
eliminated all land-based INF in three years by May 31,1991. 
  Although it had some defects that it eliminatedonly land-based missiles of inter-
22) McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.4, Fall 1991, p.94; See 
   Richard Wilson, "Nuclear Proliferation andthe Case of Iraq," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XX,No.3, 
   Spring 1991, pp.5-15.
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mediate range, that it did not eliminate nuclear warheads but only missiles, and that 
its elimination amounted to only a few per cent of all nuclear forces, the treaty is of 
great significance because it was the ferst reaty that in fact eliminated one dass of 
nuclear weapons and provided for a very strict verification System including on-site 
inspections. 
  From a political point of view, the treaty has special meaning that it codified the 
end of the Cold War and symbolized the emergence of a new era. Also of great 
importance is the fact that it was implemented completely in three years as provided 
for. Being different from the previous treaties which were preventive and demanded 
no action, this treaty asked the parties to destroy nuclear weapons, and that fact gives 
us an optimistic perspective for nuclear disarmament. 
  The START (strategic arms reduction talks) treaty which was concluded an July 
31,1991 after nine years negotiations, was made possible in part by the improvement 
of East-West relations and by the successful implementation f the NF treaty. Al-
though the treaty is sometimes referred to as stipulating the reduction of strategic 
weapons by half, it would in fact reduce them by one third because of complex counting 
rules. It does not include the regulation of SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles). 
  The numbers of nuclear weapons after eduction would be the saure as the numbers 
when negotiations tarted in 1982, and the reduction is not deep enough, but it is 
purported to have the effect of reducing the risk of nuclear war by strengthening 
strategic stability with more reductions of ICBMs and leaving nuclear forces with 
second strike capability. The START Treaty reduces strategic offensive nuclear 
weapons for the first time in history and marks a watershed for further nuclear 
reductions. In that sense the significance of the treaty can not be overemphasized. 
  After the signature of the START treaty, President Bush in September and President 
Gorbachev in October 1991 announced unilateral measures for disarmament. Firstly, 
they decided to withdraw all land-based short-range nuclear forces (SNF), which were 
mainly stationed in the area where the East and the West confronted irectly and there 
existed a danger that nuclear weapons would be used in conflicts. Secondly they also 
decided to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack sub-
marines. This means the removal of SLCMs which were not included in the START 
treaty and a big change in U.S. naval policies. 
  These unilateral but parallel measures were taken by both countries because there 
was no need to deploy them any more after the end of the Cold War and there emerged 
a danger that these tactical nuclear weapons might be taken by other states or terrorist 
groups. These measures were decided unilaterally without a legally binding agreement 
and implemented accordingly, but it is preferable to consolidate the situation with
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legally binding documents. 
  After the dissolution of the Soviet Union an December 25,1991, differences of
opinion became apparent between the Russian Federation a  the one hand and Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan  the other hand an the treatment of nuclear weapons deployed an 
the territories ofthe latter states. With a strong initiative by President Bush, the United 
States, Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan signed a protocol to the START 
Treaty an May 23,1992 in Lisbon. The protocol recognizes the altered political 
situation i the former Soviet Union, makes four states parties to the START treaty and 
obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan d Ukraine to adhere to the NPT as NNWSs. 
  The protocol meets the altered situation caused by the demise of the Soviet Union 
properly. By making three new republics parties to the treaty, itfortifies their status 
as independent states, while in substance it recognizes the Russian Federation as the 
only successor f the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. 
  On June 17,1992, President Bush and President Yeltsin agreed an substantial further 
reductions in strategie offensive arms as follows: By the year 2003, they will (1) reduce 
the overall total number of warheads for each to between 3,000 and 3,500, (2) eliminate 
all MIRVed ICBMs, and (3) reduce SLBM warheads tobetween 1,700 and 1,750. 
  Firstly, as this new agreement stipulates a reduction of nuclear warheads by two 
thirds from existing levels compared with the START treaty which only provides for 
a reduction by one third, it means further substantial reductions. Secondly, it eliminates 
all MIRVed ICBMs which were thought to be the most destabilizing bythe United 
States, and this measure will surely strengthen Strategie stability. Lastly, a substantial 
reduction of SLBMs is a compromise bythe United States for an yield by the Russia 
in MIRVed ICBMs. 
  On January 3, 1993, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the START II 
Treaty. 
  These new agreements symbolize the change of relationship between two countries 
from confrontation to partnership and friendship and they show the fade-out of the 
international situation which caused the nuclear arms race for more than 40 years. 
  The first thing which should be done as soon as possible is to make the START 
Treaty effective, that is, to accomplish t e exchanges of the instruments of ratification. 
The United States Senate has approved the Treaty by the vote of 93 to 6, and the Russia 
and Kazakhstan have approved it,but the other two former Soviet republics have not 
done so. 
  The second thing is to get approval of ratification ofthe START II Treaty between 
the United States and the Russian Federation a  further nuclear cuts from each nation's
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legislature. 
  The third thing to be done is to continue negotiations töwards further nuclear 
reductions with the goal of eliminating atfirst all ICBMs which are the most destabiliz-
ing because ofits particular characteristics, and secondly all ballistic missiles including 
SLBMs. With the end of an era of superpower rivalry, these kinds of weapons are not 
so necessary asthey were before, and this measure would help the effort o prevent 
the spread of missile technologies, which is one of the focal points in the post-Cold 
War era.23) 
  With the reduction of missiles, the participation f the United Kingdom, France 
and China to negotiations will become indispensable. 
  (b) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) 
  Since the entry into force of the NPT, many NNWSs have argued that NWSs should 
agree an a comprehensive nuclear test ban.24) Atthe last review conference in 1990, 
the opinion was that, since a CTB is the most effective measure tostrengthen the NPT 
regime, the highest priority should be given to its negotiation a d its conclusion i to 
a treaty. The very reason why the conference failed concems the differente ofopinion 
an a CTB between the United States and Mexico 25) 
  In the preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, three depositary states ought to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions ofnuclear weapons for all time. They 
were determined to continue negotiations to this end, and a preambular paragraph of
the NPT recalled their determination as a concrete xample of their intention an 
disarmament negotiations. 
  In January 1991, a conference to amend the Partial Test Ban Treaty into a com-
prehensive t st ban treaty was held, but the effort was unsuccessful because amend-
ments of the treaty needed the consent of all three depositary governments including 
the United States and the United Kingdom. 
  Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed an the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty in 1976, which 
prohibited nuclear explosions above 150 kiloton yield. They had not been ratified for 
a long time but at last with the conclusion of verification protocols to them in June 
23) See Alton Frye, "Zero Ballistic Missiles," Foreign Policy, No.88, Fall 1992, pp.3-20. 
24) Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara and George W.Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War," Foreign 
   Affairs, Vol.70, No.4, Fall 1991, p.109. 
25) See Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "The NPT and the CTBT: Linkages, Options and Opportunities," 
    Arms Control, Vol.13, No.1, April 1992, pp.85-107; JohnM. Deutch, "The New NuclearThreat," Foreign 
    Affairs, Vol.71, No.4, Fall 1992, p.130.
38 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [No. 40:21 
1990, they were ratified an December 11,1990. The negotiations for a CTB, which 
had been conducted by the three nations from 1977, was suspended by the Reagan 
administration i 1981. 
  The Soviet Union which has proclaimed aunilateral suspension of nuclear tests an 
occasion since 1986 with requests for the United States to take a parallel step, has been 
rather affirmative to a CTB, while the United States and the United Kingdom have 
argued for a step-by-step approach leading ultimately to a CTB as a long-term goal. 
  While the U.S Administration has been reluctant to take steps to a'CTB, alter the 
House of Representatives had approved aone-year testing moratorium the Senate voted 
overwhelmingly an August 3,1992 to suspend nuclear weapons testing for nine 
months, limit the number of tests to less than five for the next three years and 
permanently ban all tests by 1996. Under this strong pressure from the Congress and 
also with the desire to win the presidential election, an October 2, President Bush 
signed a bill passed by the Congress. But this bill has the reservation that it works as 
long as other NWSs refrain from conducting nuclear tests. 
  Now we face a good opportunity to proceed to a CTB, because Russia and France 
have declared their intentions to support a moratorium and the U.S. will suspend 
testing soon. Cooperation of the United Kingdom and China is indispensable for a 
CTB to become ffective. 
  We have enough reason to be optimistic because the five NWSs have become 
parties to the NPT and are now under the obligations of Article VI. With the end of 
the Cold War international society is entering adifferent world with less emphasis an 
military strength. 
iii) Security of NNWSs 
  As the NPT regime permits the NWSs to keep their nuclear weapons, they can 
assure their own security with nuclear weapons, and the states which are under the 
nuclear umbrella may depend an the NWS's nuclear weapons. In order to strengthen 
the NPT regime and win a larger participation of NNWSs, it is indispensable totake 
measures to strengthen the security of states which have voluntarily forsworn the 
nuclear option. 
  (a) Negative Security Assurances 
  Negative security assurances which prohibit he use or threat of the use of nuclear 
weapons against NNWSs parties to the NPT have been asked for by NNWSs since the 
time of treaty negotiation, and at the first review conference some NNWSssubmitted 
an additional protocol HI to formalize the assurances into a legal document. Although
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all five NWSs have made declarations annegative security assurances at the first and 
second special sessions ofthe United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarma-
ment in 1978 and 1982, their declarations are neither uniform nor legally binding and 
NNWSs demand negative s curity guarantees which have uniform contents and legally 
binding force. 
  At the fourth review,conference in 1990, Nigeria submitted a proposa126) an an 
agreement anthe prohibition ofthe use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against 
NNWSs parties to the NPT, which would assure negative security to NNWSs parties 
to the Treaty which are not members ofa military alliance with NWS, and those which 
are members of a military alliance with NWSs but do not permit deployment of nuclear 
weapons an their territory. 
  It seems there is emerging a very favorable situation for codifying negative s curity 
assurances. Firstly, the rationale for an extended deterrence aused by the Cold War 
has disappeared with the improvement of East-West relations, the democratization of 
former eastern European states and the dissolution ofthe Warsaw Treaty Organization. 
Secondly, the need to supplement inferiority in conventional rms with nuclear 
weapons also has disappeared with the conclusion of the Treaty an Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE). Thirdly, tactical nuclear forces haue been withdrawn by the 
unilateral decisions ofPresidents Bush and Gorbachev in September and October 1991, 
and lastly it has become possible for the five NWSs to negotiate his problem within 
the framework of the NPT because China and France have ratified the treaty and 
become parties. 
  (b) Positive Security Assurances 
  Positive security assurance, which means to give assistance when a NNWS party 
to the treaty is under the threat of or under attack by nuclear weapons, was given 
through Security Council resolution 255 (1968) at the time of the adoption ofthe NPT. 
In 1968 the People's Republic of China, which was not a member of the U.N., was 
thought to be a potential ggressor in the resolution, but after the PRC got a seat at the 
Security Council in 1971, the resolution has been thought to be ineffective because of
the veto power. 
  Withthe increase ofpotential nuclear-weapon states, Egypt, which is afraid of a 
nuclear attack by Israel, demands positive security assurances and at the fourth review 
conference alled upon the U.N. Security Council to adopt anew resolution an security 
assurances which included assurances beyond what Security Council resolution 255 
26) NPT/CONF.IV/17, 24 August 1990.
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of 1968 provided for.27) 
  In entering the post-Cold War era and with the prospect that the United Nations 
would revive its role in maintaining international peace and security, it is advisable to 
arrange for effective action by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
but action must be under the stritt control of the Security Council. 
  To recognize positive security assurances to an individual state is dangerous and 
not recommendable b cause itwould increase the possibility of nuclear weapons being 
used and it would also enhance the political value of possessing nuclear weapons. 
  (c) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 
  The concept of NWFZs is based an the "total absence of nuclear weapons", and 
includes the obligation of non-deployment besides non-manufacture and non-receipt 
which are main obligations under the NPT. As a NWFZ is a regional approach while 
the NPT is a global one, both measures are complementary. In a region where some 
states do not want to join the NPT, a regional approach, that is, the creation of NWFZ 
should be pursued. 
  For the establishment of NWFZ, cooperation by NWSs is indispensable. NWSs 
have to respect the zones and undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against states included in the zones. All five NWSs have ratified the Additional 
Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin America, but only two NWSs, that is, the 
Soviet Union and China have ratified Protocol 2 to the Rarotonga Treaty in the South 
Pacific. As the international situation has substantially changed, the United States and 
the United Kingdom should accede to the Protocol and France, now suspending nuclear 
weapon tests, should undertake negative security assurances. 
  There have been many proposals for establishing NWFZs in various regions in the 
world, but realization of the proposals was hindered by the Cold War. Now we should 
enhance our efforts to establish NWFZs in many regions, because favorable conditions 
for establishing NWFZs have emerged with the demise of the Cold War era. Firstly, 
in Africa where a proposal for establishing a NWFZ has existed since 1960 and South 
Africa, the most dangerous and potential nuclear state, now acceded to the NPT, 
African states hould now endeavor to create a NWFZ. 
  Secondly, in Southeast Asia where the genegal situation has gotten better because 
of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Vietnam, the closing of the U.S. bases in the 
Philippines and the ceasefire of the Cambodian civil war, not only ASEAN states but 
also other countries in the region should begin discussions toward creating a NWFZ. 
27) NPT/C0NF.IV/31, 24 August 1990.
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  Thirdly, in the Korean Peninsula where U.S. nuclear weapons have been 
withdrawn, North Korea has accepted IAEA safeguards, and both Korean states have 
agreed to a denuclearization f the Peninsula making the Peninsula de facto NWFZ, it 
is possible to translate a de facto NWFZ into de jure NWFZ, though the Situation of 
North Korea is not clear enough. It might be possible to extend the NWFZ to include 
Japan which has three non-nuclear policies and a politically proclaimed nuclear-
weapon-free status. 
  In the establishment of NWFZs NNWSs can take the initiative, and by creating 
them, they are entitled to demand that NWSs undertake not to use nuclear weapons 
against states included in the zones. There is a general legal conviction that NWSs 
should respect NNWSs within NWFZs. 
iv) Strengthening of Safeguards 
  Safeguards which have been conducted by the IAEA are an important component 
of the NPT regime. The safeguards system, whose purpose is to prevent he diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons, has played a significant role 
in maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime while the regime has been developing. 
And now it is also necessary and possible to extend the safeguards network and 
implement i more vigorously in order to bolster the NPT regime. 
  (a) Full-Scope Safeguards 
  Under paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT, NNWSs which are not parties to the 
treaty have to accept IAEA safeguards when they receive nuclear materials or equip-
ment from states party to the treaty, and safeguards apply only to materials or equip-
ment which are provided. The first effort in applying this paragraph is to agree which 
materials or equipment trigger safeguards, and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group 
has been working to agree an a trigger list. 
  The second problem with this paragraph is the comprehensive application of 
safeguards to NNWSs non-party to the treaty. This is an attempt to cover all peaceful 
nuclear activities in NNWSs non-party to the treaty under IAEA safeguards. The 
reasons are, first, to eliminate discriminatory treatment between NNWSs party to the 
treaty and NNWSs not a party to the treaty, and second, to extend the NPT regime ven 
to NNWSs non-parties. Based an these reasons, full-scope safeguards have been 
argued since the first review conference. 
  Australia, Canada, Sweden and the United States have argued that full-scope 
safeguards must apply in providing assistance, and they have asked recipients to apply 
full-scope safeguards in their policies or domestic laws. Other countries like the
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United Kingdom, France and Germany have requested the application of safeguards 
only to those provided, though at the fourth review conference Germany changed its 
policy and adopted fall-scope safeguards application. 
  Having acceded to the treaty, France and China are expected to apply full-scope 
safeguards, though they have been very reluctant to adopt hem. 
  (b) Special Inspections 
  As the safeguards ystem which is applied to NNWSs party to the treaty are 
concerned with only declared facilities, there is the possibility that a state will conduct 
nuclear weapon research and development with no safeguards applied. At the time of 
treaty negotiations, this issue was raised but it was generally believed that to conduct 
the research and development in secret was very difficult and would not happen.1) But 
as the recent Iraqi experience has shown, it proves possible to be a party to the treaty 
and at the same time to conduct he research and development of nuclear weapons.29) 
  Against this background, the necessity to inspect undeclared facilities has been 
recognized. According to Article 73 of safeguards agreement which is concluded 
between the IAEA and NNWS party to the treaty in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 
4 of Article HI of the NPT, the IAEA may make special inspections if the IAEA 
considers that information made available by the government and information obtained 
from routine inspections i not adequate for the IAEA to fulfill its responsibilities under 
this Agreement. According to Article 77, however, in circumstances which may lead 
to special inspections, the Govemment and the IAEA shall consult forthwith, and as a 
result of such consultations the IAEA is able to obtain access to information or locations 
which are not declared. 
  As specialinspections under the safeguards agreement may be made only when a 
government agrees to it after consultation with the IAEA, the IAEA can not make 
special inspections without consent of govemment concerned. In circumstances like 
the Iraqi case, a consent will not be expected. But if a government refuses special 
inspections, it increases the suspicion of violations, and the Board of Govemors of the 
IAEA would take necessary measures and also the Security Council of the United 
28) Jan Prawitz, "Arguments for Extended NPT Safeguards," in SIPRI, Nuclear P oliferation Problems, 1974, 
    p.161; Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Technical C pabilities of Safeguards," in Bennet Boskey and MasonWillrich 
    (eds.), Nuclear P oliferation: Prospects for Control, 1970, p.54; Paul Szasz, "InternationalAtomic Energy 
    Safeguards," in Mason Willrich (ed.), International Safeguards andNuclear Industry, 1977, pp.95-96. 
29) Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear P oliferation in the Middle East," Orbis, Vol.36, No.2, Spring 1992, pp.181-
   186.
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Nations would take measures including sanctions.30) The IAEA has never conducted 
special inspections provided for in the safeguards agreement, and it is necessary for 
the IAEA to examine the problem and make procedural process clear.31) 
  The authority to conduct inspections against a state's will belongs to the Security 
Council of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter, but the IAEA does 
not have such authority. 
                  CONCLUSION 
  In the post-Cold War international society, where nuclear weapons have been 
reduced and the prospect for future reduction seems bright, the danger of nuclear 
proliferation is as urgent as or more urgent han before. The NPT regime which has 
played a central role to regulate nuclear weapons activities in nuclear age, has been 
supported generally with more than 150 states becoming parties. Although a consensus 
against nuclear proliferation seems to prevail, there exist some states which do not 
want to join the NPT so as to keep the nuclear Option open, and some states which are 
parties to the treaty but trying to develop nuclear weapons in secret. 
  It is imperative to make efforts to keep and strengthen the NPT regime and prevent 
the further spread of nuclear weapons, but the gist of the issue is rather political than 
military. As a long-term strategy, it is necessary to decrease the political importance 
which nuclear weapons imply.32) Technical measures uch as export control and 
safeguards are effective in the short-term, and those measures afford enough time to 
take political measures to prevent nuclear weapons. Those technical measures should 
not be an end in themselves but only a means to take political measures. 
  We should make efforts towards the establishment of new international nd regional 
security orders which are based an nuclear disarmament and negative security assur-
ances in order to make a more peaceful world as well as to deal with nuclear 
proliferation. 
30) Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, "Treaty Review: Deadlock Damages Nonproliferation," 
   Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1990, p.41. 
31) Jozef Goldblat, "The Fourth Review ofthe NPT," Bulletin ofPeace Proposal, Vo1.21, No.4, 1990, p.416. 
32) Peter A. Clausen, "Nuciear Proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s," in Michael T.Klare and Daniel C. Thomas 
   (eds.), World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End, 1991, p.166.
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